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I.  Introduction  
Since the Single European Market (SEM) has been established, the free movement of goods has been 
facilitated not only by removing border formalities, but also by the technical harmonisation of national 
legislation of each member state. For the agri food sector a particular concern is to guarantee the 
safety and integrity of products. In this respect, the European Commission has developed a stringent 
policy regarding food safety and consumer information. Hence, strict regulation is imposed for all 
agri food products commercialized in the SEM, whether of European or third country provenance. In 
the  case  of  EU  enlargement,  accession  to  the  SEM  is  conditional  upon  the  candidate  countries 
accepting the obligations of the internal market, and therefore accepting these principles of free trade. 
Fulfilling the requirements for EU accession means for the acceding countries not only costs related to 
adjustments of their production technologies in order to be consistent with the acquis communautaire, 
but also benefits. First, there will occur qualitative gains for citizens, through the improvement of the 
food safety and of the quality of life. Second, there will be measurable gains for the new member 
states  (NMS),  that  should  benefit  both  from  the  abolishment  of  the  tariff  barriers  and the likely 
reduction of transaction costs resulting from the adoption of the European standards. 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to assess the impact of trade barriers on agri food exports from 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) towards the EU on the eve of their integration. Does 
the abolition of tariffs and the implementation of the acquis communautaire mean that these countries 
enjoy equal access to the European markets as the old EU members do, or are they still in the same 
situation in terms of market access as any other third country? To answer these questions, the border 
effect methodology initiated by McCallum (1995) and subsequently widely employed (see among 
others Chen, 2004; Mayer and Zignago, 2005) is used in order to analyse the impact of national   3
borders on trade. More precisely, the principle of the analysis is extended from national borders to the 
external frontiers of the European Union, by assuming that the SEM is an integrated area where 
barriers to trade are low. In other words, the aim of the paper is to measure the impact of EU borders 
(called hereafter border effect) and to assess the role tariff and non tariff measures play in explaining 
this effect. Hence, just prior to joining the SEM, do NMS still face a border effect at entry to the EU 
market? Has this effect been reduced over the period of preparation for enlargement?  
To  answer  these  questions, a gravity model defined at a highly disaggregated level is used. The 
theoretical foundation of our gravity equation is provided by the work of Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) who analysed trade resistances between partners. In addition to classical determinants, our 
model includes specific variables for trade barriers as tariff and non tariff measures. More precisely, 
concerning non tariff measures, European standards regulating the entry of products into the European 
market  are  studied,  either  technical  measures  to  ensure  products  meet  quality  requirements  (e.g 
labelling  standards)  or  measures  to  protect  consumers  or  herds  (e.g  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
standards).  
The model is applied to agri food imports of the EU15 (intra and extra EU imports) and estimated for 
two years: firstly 1999, when despite the Europe Agreements, the liberalization of agri food trade 
between CEECs8 and the EU was at an infant stage (before the 2000 ‘zero zero’ agreements), , and 
secondly 2004 – the year of actual enlargement. In this year, after the 1
st May, tariff protection vis à 
vis NMS was abolished, which should lead to a reduced border effect. The comparison between the 
two years may highlight the role acquis communautaire had on trade during the pre accession period. 
Finally, among the CEECs, EU market access of the recent new member states – called hereafter NMS 
or CEECs8 – (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) is 
compared to that of the two forthcoming members – called hereafter Acceding countries (AC) – 
Romania and Bulgaria.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section goes over recent trade developments and the main 
policy instruments for trade between the EU and CEECs. The model used in the empirical part of the 
paper is then described. Data and model variables are then reviewed. The results are discussed, then 
conclusions drawn in the final section.   4
 
 
II.  The  measurement  of  border  effect  (trade  resistance):  from  the  theoretical  
framework to the empirical assessment 
 
Although there is a wealth of articles evaluating the impact of enlargement on trade, few studies focus 
specifically on the tariff and non tariff impact that enlargement of the single market can have on trade. 
See for example articles by Manchin et al. (2003), Nahuis (2004). Using gravity modelling, they have 
estimated the significance border effects have for trade between NMSs and the EU. Their implicit 
hypothesis was that any potential trade gain is due partially to the lifting of barriers at the EU border. 
Nahuis  (2004)  shows  that  for  CEECs  the  highest  border effects at entry to the EU occur in the 
agricultural and food sector, and he consequently anticipates the highest trade gain for these products. 
Manchin et al. (2003 and 2005) estimate the impact technical barriers have on border effects between 
the EU and CEECs. More precisely, following Brenton et al. (2001), they look at how the different 
modalities adopted by the EU to harmonise regulation within the single market impact on trade with 
CEECs. They conclude that the less harmonized the standards are, the higher the border effect they 
have.  
The goal of this paper is to reveal the role of both tariffs and non tariff barriers (NTBs) in the 
NMS  agri food  exports  to  the  EU  market,  by  quantifying  the  border  effect  faced  by  NMS  and 
assessing to what extent tariffs and NTBs have impeded trade flows in the pre accession period.  
The rest of this section sets out how, from our gravity equation, we propose to catch the overall 
impediments faced by countries at entry to the EU market (border effect), and to capture in this border 
effect the role of tariffs and non tariff measures. Finally, the econometric issues are addressed. 
 
1. The theoretical framework. 
Gravity models represent one of the most common options for assessing bilateral trade flows, either in 
the “classical” specification or in their further developments within the new international economics 
theory
ii. The model proposed hereafter follows on from new developments in gravity equations made 
notably by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The main hypotheses for the model used are set out   5
below, while the technical details on the derivation of the model can be found in Appendix 1. 
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it is assumed that all goods are differentiated by origin, 
consumer  demand  (in  the  importing  country)  being  defined  by  a  CES  utility  function.  This 
specification allows both components of total demand   imports and domestic production – to be taken 
into account. At the disaggregated level of this current study (i.e. at product level)
iii, the empirical 
estimation faces a serious data constraint: production data are not available for all products and all 
countries. To get around this difficulty, our proposal is to focus exclusively on the EU’s import flows, 
by modelling not the total demand, but the import demand for individual agri food products (without 
looking at the domestic supply). In other words, intra national flows are excluded from our analysis. 
This implies adding a major supplementary hypothesis to Anderson’s model, i.e. that the consumer 
follows a two step budgetary procedure. In the first step, the importing country’s consumers define the 
import  demand,  choosing  between  domestic  and  imported  products  in  order  to  satisfy  the  total 
demand. In the second step, the import demand is differentiated by country of origin. Thus, only this 
second step of the budgetary procedure is examined, under the assumption that the first one has 
already been carried out, and thus the total import demand already defined.  
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where  ijk x is the nominal value of exports from i to j for product k 
jk m  is the total expenditure of j for the imported product k (the total imports of j) 
ik x  is the total exports of i for product k  
wk Y is the total world trade in product k (sum of total imports for product k for all countries j) 
ijk P  is the delivered price of product k from country i, paid by consumer in j 
jk P  is the CES index import price of product k in country j  
thus  jk ijk P P  is the price competitiveness of i on market j.   6
And  ik Y  is a CES index of price competitiveness of i on the world market (see equation 9 Appendix 
1).  
The delivered price  ijk P  differs from the exporter’s supply price ik P , because of trade costs between i 
and j. These trade costs are broadly defined to include all costs incurred in getting a good to the final 
user, excluding the production cost of the good itself (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). It is also 
called the ‘bilateral trade resistance’ and encompasses mainly tariffs, transport costs, and non tariff 
barriers. Taking into account the trade costs (Tijk), the relation between the two prices becomes: 
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P  may be defined as the cost competitiveness of i in comparison to that of j (without any 
trade barrier). 
 
Following Péridy (2005), it is assumed that  ijk T    in addition to policy related barriers (e.g. tariffs and 
NTBs)  and  transport  costs  (proxied  by  distance)     also  reflects  other  border  variables  ( ijk B ) 
stimulating bilateral trade (a common border, a common language, etc.), and the remaining trade 
resistance effect ( ijk O ) inhibiting trade (cultural differences, home bias, etc.). Among these other 
factors, Chen (2004) or Disdier et al (2006) investigate informal trade barriers, such as product 
specific  information  costs,  and  their  role  in  explaining  the  trade  reduction  effect.  ijk T   therefore 
becomes:  
n V l q r
ijk ij ijk ijk ijk O B NTB t d T
ij =   (3) 
where r < 0, (the higher the transport costs, the lower the bilateral trade) and q <0 (the higher the 
tariffs, the lower the exports). The sign of l is not defined (see OECD, 2002; Beghin and Bureau, 
2001). It depends on the nature of the regulation. Some regulations may act as transaction costs and   7
reduce trade. For others, the regulation may in a first instance act as a barrier when products do not 
meet standards, but once standards are met they may facilitate trade. z is expected to be positive 
(countries are supposed to exchange more when they share a common border, a common language or a 
common historical link). n <0 : the higher the unobserved trade resistance, the lower the exports.  
While checking for possible endogeneity of total exports (Xik), total imports (Mjk) and world demand 
(Ywk),  these  three  variables  have  been  moved  to  the  left  side  of  the  equation
iv.  This  solution 
constrains the coefficient of total exports, total imports and world demand to be equal to 1. In this way 
it is not the value of the bilateral flow which is regressed but the coefficient of relative bilateral trade 





m x RI =    (4) 
This index compares the proportion of imports of good k from i in the total imports of j, to the market 
share of the exporter i in the international market. An index equal to 1 means that the flow of good k 
between j and i is determined only by the size of the partners. A coefficient other than 1 means that 
trade is determined by other factors than country size: if it is greater than one, it denotes privileged 
trade links between i and j for good k, whereas an index less than one refers to trade resistance 
between the two countries which could be explained by the low competitiveness of j, but also by trade 
costs. 
 
2. A step by step empirical assessment of trade resistance: the role of tariffs and NTBs in 
the border effect. 
 
Since most impediments to trade are difficult to measure (notably what we have called “other trade 
resistances”) it is first necessary to establish a global measure of trade resistances faced by CEECs at 
entry to the EU market. This global image is the border effect defined by Mayer and Zignago (2005). 
To catch this effect and then investigate the role of tariffs and non tariff measures, it is necessary to 
proceed in several steps.  
  The first step is to measure the overall border effect faced by third countries at entry to the 
EU. We therefore regress model [1] directly derived from eq [2] of the theoretical part. In this way, it   8
is possible to measure the impact of price competitiveness, transport costs and cultural proximity 
(border contiguity and historical links) on bilateral trade between i and j. j is a EU 15 importing 
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Recalling eq [2] of the theoretical part, Tijk becomes ( )
k j
k i ij ij ijk K T B d T
5 4 3 2 1 a a a a s=
-
. Thus, Ti are exporting 
country dummies included in order to catch all the other trade impediments than transport costs faced 
by country i at the entry of the EU market (whatever the EU importing country). While taking into 
account heterogeneity of countries, to avoid numerous dummies
vi, four country group dummies have 
been included, each of them corresponding to the area the exporting country belongs to: NMS (the 
New member states), AC (Acceding countries i.e Romania and Bulgaria), EU (the 15 EU member 
states) and ROW (the Rest of the Word)
vii. The coefficients  i
4 a of these dummies are calculated with 
regard to that of the EU dummy, the EU member states being supposed to face the lowest trade 
resistance at entry to the market of their EU partners. These coefficients catch the border effect faced 
by EU trading partners. Dummies Kk capture specific product effects. 
This first step, then, allows the following questions to be answered:  
i/ what is the magnitude of the border effect faced by trading partners at entry to the SEM?; ii/ what is 
the situation for NMS and acceding countries?; iii/ has the border effect changed over time? 
 
The second step is to analyse the role of tariffs for each group of countries, and the overall impact of 
NTBs for all exporting countries. Hence the estimated equation becomes [model 2]
viii:  
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i
6 a  catches the different impact of tariffs (tijk) for the three groups of countries (NMS, AC and ROW). 
7 a ,  8 a 9 a  capture the overall impact of the different NTBs included in the model (San, Phyto and 
Qual are dummy variables indicating the presence of a NTB measure: respectively sanitary measures; 
phytosanitary and quality measures). Finally, the coefficient 
j '
4 a catches the impact of remaining trade   9
resistance for NMS, AC and the ROW with regard to the EU.  
This second step therefore allows the following questions to be answered:  
i/ is border effect totally explained by tariffs and NTBs? ;ii/ does the impact of tariffs vary between the 
three groups of countries?; iii/ what is the overall impact of NTBs?; iv/ have these impacts changed 
over time? 
 
The aim of the third step is to evaluate the role of each NTB for each group of countries. For the sake 
of simplicity, only the model for sanitary measures [model 3] is presented here,: the other two being 
derived in the same manner  
The estimated equation becomes: [model 3]
ix 
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ik San  is a dummy indicating the presence of a sanitary measure for product k imported from i. Hence, 
1
7
i a measures  the  border  effect  for  products  subject  to  sanitary  measure  imported  from  i.;  while 
0
7
i a concerns products not subject to sanitary measures originating from i. The difference between  1
7
i a  
and  0
7
i a  therefore evaluates the impact of the sanitary measure on the border effect.  
This third step therefore allows the following questions to be answered: 
i/ how much do NTBs increase or reduce the border effect for each group of countries?; ii/ have these 
impacts  changed  over  time?;  iii/  may  any  conclusions  be  drawn  about  the  role  of  acquis 
communautaire for the New Member States?   
 
1.  The econometric method.  
Insofar as one of our objectives is to assess the impact of different trade barriers and, more precisely, 
to identify those which prohibit trade, not only actual bilateral trade but also “zero values” i.e. all 
potential bilateral flows must be taken into account 
x. OLS regressions of the relative intensity index 
would not take into account the high proportion of zero trade flows, and so would lead to biased 
estimators. An efficient way to take such a selection bias into account is to use the Heckman procedure 
(Heckman, 1979; Greene, 1981). This method makes it possible to assess whether selection bias is   10
present, to identify factors contributing to the selection bias, and to control for this bias in estimating 
the outcomes of interest. The Heckman method attempts to control for the effect of non random 
selection by incorporating both the observed and unobserved factors that affect non response (Sales et 
al., 2004). Consequently, the effects of the different trade barriers are tested at two stages of the export 
process: first, the decision of a country to export or not (actually the global decision of a nation’s 
potential exporting firms); second, when export occurs, the effects of trade barriers on the volume of 
traded products (more precisely the value of the log of the Relative Bilateral Intensity of trade Riijk).  
In order to compare the dynamics of the role played by various trade barriers (between 1999 and 2004) 
a cross section analysis is used and the data for the two years are pooled. The significance level of the 
difference between coefficients obtained for the two years is tested through a Wald test
xi. Moreover, in 
order to be able to compare coefficients from one model to another and because the coefficients were 
stable, the different models have been nested by constraining  1 a 2 a 3 a to be equal to those obtained in 
[model 1]. Finally the residuals of the estimations have been controlled graphically to validate the 
assumption of their normality. 
 
III.  Data and variables 
In what follows, the analysis focuses on imports to the EU from all its trading partners (EU and non 
EU members). The index of relative bilateral intensity of trade RIijk has been computed using the 
COMTRADE  database.  Data  have  been  aggregated  at  4 digit  level  in  the  Harmonized  System, 
resulting in about 165 products.  
The bilateral cost-competitiveness is the ratio between i’s export price ( ik P ) and the j’s import for 
product k ( jk P ).  jk P  should normally be a CES index of import price. The average import price of j 
has been used as a proxy of this index (i.e the unit value of the total imports of j). For  ik P  the FOB 
unit value of the export of i to the market j is used. Because of the lack of data about quantities in the 
COMTRADE database, these unit values have been computed from the COMEXT Database at 4 digit 
level.  
Nonetheless, as the necessary data for calculating the index of global competitiveness ( ik Y ) are not   11
available, this variable has not been introduced into our estimation. Nevertheless, this omission is not 
as trivial as it seems. The impact of this effect will be shared among the other variables, notably 
country dummies Ti (border effect).  
For the transport costs between two countries, the distance d
ij (calculated by the CEPII
xii) between the 
capitals of i and j has be taken as a proxy. As far as the contiguity variable (Bij) is concerned, a 
dummy variable has been introduced, equal to 1 if the two trading partners have a common border, 
otherwise equal to 0. The common history has been caught through the dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if the exporting country was a colony of its trading partner. As for the tariffs, t
 denotes the 
tariff applied by the EU country j to its partner i for the product k. This information is available from 
the TARIC Database (DG Taxation) and it is the same for every EU country due to the common 
commercial policy and is therefore t
ik rather than t
ijk. Because t
ik is considered to be a measure of all the 
taxes country i has to pay at entry to the EU market, the calculation takes into account preferential 
agreements where they exist (notably the European agreements in view of the CEECs accession to the 
SEM) and all the measures applied (i.e not only the ad valorem part of the tariffs, but also the specific 
duties). Hence t
ik is an ad-valorem equivalent
xiii for tariffs. Finally, in order to avoid eliminating from 
the estimation products not subject to tariffs (lnt
ik =
  ∞), the variable is transformed in the following 
way: lnt
ik = ln(t
ik+ 1).  
When entering the EU market, each specific product coming from a third country should be submitted 
to a wide ranging set of regulations. Different non-tariff variables have been built in order to capture 
the set of border regulations (available on the French customs website (http://www.douane.gouv.fr/). 
In addition to tariffs, this website provides full information on the commitments that products entering 
the EU markets should fulfil. There are about 60 such rules applying to agri food products, classified 
by the customs office into 15 categories, including sanitary, phytosanitary, commercialisation, public 
health, protecting wild fauna, and so on. 
Starting from this classification, three types of measures are introduced: 1. Sanitary measures; 2. 
Maximum Residue Level of Pesticides (MRL) and 3. Quality measures. 
In  order  to  meet  sanitary  requirements  veterinary  controls  imposed  inside  the  EU  should  be   12
accompanied by strict border controls. Sanitary measures therefore include veterinary measures for 
animals  (breeding  and  production)  designed  to  protect  both  animal  and  public  health.  They  are 
comprised of different categories: animal health; hygiene of food of animal origin; animal feeds and 
veterinary pharmaceuticals. The first condition that needs to be met by a third country trying to sell 
products on the European market is to be on the list of authorized countries
xiv. This list is defined 
according to general criteria –the medical state of livestock, the organization of veterinary services, 
and the medical regulation in force. When crossing the EU border there are three levels of veterinary 
control: documents are checked, the identity checked and a physical check of the animals is carried 
out.  
The phytosanitary measure refers to standards for the maximum residue level of pesticides (MRL). 
In order to protect animal and human health, foodstuffs intended for human or animal consumption in 
the European Union (EU) are now subject to a MRL of pesticides in their composition. Up until 2005, 
different directives
xv were applied to different sectors (fruit & vegetables, cereals, foodstuffs of animal 
origin   meat & some dairy products   and products of vegetable origin). The objective was to ensure 
that pesticide residues in foodstuffs do not constitute an unacceptable risk for consumer and animal 
health.  
Quality measures cover the set of standards relating to product quality control, other than sanitary 
and phytosanitary requirements, for instance commercial characteristics such as freshness, calibration, 
and conditioning. The products must be accompanied by a quality control certificate. All information 
must  appear  on  the  label,  especially  for  products  such  as  meat,  eggs, fresh fruit and vegetables, 
prepared vegetables, etc.  
These three categories of regulation have been introduced into the model as dummy variables. They 
have a value of 1 if the product is subjected to regulation, and 0 otherwise. Vancauteren and Henri de 
Frahan (2006) or Haveman and Thursby (2000) did not use a dummy variable, but a "trade weighted 
coverage ratio" for each category of standards. Working at our detailed level, choosing the alternative 
measure would make little difference, because for the majority of products at 4 digit level all the 
goods within a category are subject to the same standards. The product dummy is defined at the 2 digit 
level of the nomenclature and thus captures the specificity of the groups of products    13
 
IV.  Results and discussion  
From an econometric point of view, the two modelling steps (selection and regression of Bilateral 
relative  intensity)  are  not  independent  (value  of  rho  and  of  Chi2).  The  results  of  the  Heckman 
procedure are shown in Table 2 4 which presents separately each stage of the export process: i) the 
decision  to  export  to  the  European  market  (Probit  estimations)  and  ii)  the  regression  (volume 
equation). Results of the volume equation are discussed below. Differences between the results of the 
selection and the regression part will be presented in the text when necessary (notably when discussing 
the role of NTBs as trade barriers).  
Results obtained in [model 1] for “classical” variables are in line with expectations for a gravity 
model. Distance restricts trade between two countries. Conversely, having a common border and a 
common  history  (colony)  stimulates  trade  between  partners.  Moreover,  the  bilateral  price 
competitiveness has a significant impact on trade: the higher the export price of the exporting country 
compared to the importing price, the lower the volume of exports (Table 2b). 
Beside these classical variables, the border effect at entry to the EU market is captured separately for 
the three geographical zones. For the three groups, the coefficient is significantly negative showing 
that third countries exchange less with EU countries than EU members among themselves. This effect 
was greater in 2004 than in 1999. Contrary to what might be expected, the border effect is highest for 
NMS ( 1.42), while it is much lower for Romania and Bulgaria ( 0.66). In other words, despite the 
accession process, trade resistance was still high for NMS on the eve of their integrating the EU. 
However, this border effect remained stable for NMS over the period while it increased for all other 
third countries. Does this result reveal a trade diversion effect due to the enlargement process? In fact, 
the increase of CEEC 10 exports towards the EU has led simultaneously to a decrease in the ROW’s 
share in total EU agro food imports. 
Results from [model 2], when tariffs and NTBs have been taken into account, show a reduced but still 
significant border effect (Table 2). In other words, determinants other than tariffs and NTBs explain 
trade resistance at entry to the EU market. This is once again particularly true for NMS for which the 
border effect remains high (1.05 in 2004).     14
How can this remaining high level of trade resistance for the CEECs be explained? Among transition 
related factors that impede trade and are difficult to measure, Bussière, Firdmuc and Schnatz (2005) 
mention the low quality of transport infrastructures, the lack of expertise of foreign firms in doing 
business with these countries, as well as institutional uncertainties surrounding the transition process. 
It is further stated that over the last decade it has taken time for businesses in CEECs, to make new 
contacts, to acquire new marketing skills, and to convince the EU and other clients abroad to place 
trust in them and perceive them as reliable partners. For instance, Rauch (1999) shows that it is more 
costly to obtain information about the quality or even existence of a foreign product in comparison to a 
domestic  one,  and  it  is  likely  that  these  higher  costs  will  reduce  the  quantity  of  foreign  goods 
purchased. The role of history also offers some explanation for the geographical orientation of CEECs 
traders away from the EU (an aspect of global competitiveness or multilateral trade resistance we were 
not able to measure directly). Despite the disintegration of Eastern Europe – the break up of the 
former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia   trade flows between the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, between the Baltic states, and between Slovenia and former Yugoslavia still remain quite 
strong, exceeding (according to Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) normal levels. All newly independent 
countries in Eastern Europe trade much more intensively with their previous counterparts than with 
other  countries,  despite  greater  open  and  hidden  trade  barriers  between  the  successor  countries 
(transaction costs, exchange rate uncertainty and political instability). These results for the former 
federations in Eastern Europe thus indicate a very strong bias, explaining the trade resistance towards 
the EU. Hence, as shown in Chart 1, only 29% of Slovene exports are sold to the EU (27% for the 
Slovak Republic).  
 
Concerning the impact of tariffs, the results of [model 2] in Table 2b highlight the reduction in tariff 
elasticity for NMS, whilst this coefficient remains stable for the ROW. It is noteworthy that in the 
probit estimation tariffs no longer act as a trade barrier anymore in 2004 (Table 2b). This is an 
expected result, since tariffs for NMS were abolished in May 2004, the date of the EU enlargement. 
However, in 1999 the impact of tariffs was still high because the liberalisation process was far from 
complete. For Acceding Countries, the effect of association trade agreements is also reflected in the   15
Probit estimation. But in the regression part, tariff elasticity is positive for these two countries: the 
higher the tariff, the higher the export volume. What are the reasons behind this very puzzling result? 
On the one hand, it could be explained by their supply structure. Restructuring the sector in response 
to the European framework for less protected products would require time and financial assets. For 
Romania, for instance, agro food exports account for a very small proportion of the national product 
(around 5% in 2004) and are mainly oriented towards the EU market. On the other hand, the labour 
force in these countries is cheap leading to cheap products. Hence, despite tariff duties, products 
originating from Romania and Bulgaria are competitive on the European market due to their lower 
prices. 
 
What is the impact of non-tariff measures on the border effect?   
  Overall impact of NTBs 
The  three  introduced  measures  –  sanitary,  phytosanitary  and  quality  standards     have  significant 
negative coefficients in the probit selection part equation (Table 2a,  [model 2]). These coefficients 
catch the impact of sanitary measures on the decision to export towards the EU. Their significant 
negative  sign  means  that  the  measures  act  as  a  very  significant  trade  barrier  for  the  products 
concerned.  Nevertheless,  the  impact  of  sanitary  measures  in  the  regression  (volume  equation)  is 
significantly  positive  (table  2b,  [model2]).  Hence  once  the  barrier  has  been  overcome,  sanitary 
measures enhance trade. Conversely phytosanitary and quality measures seem to reduce trade for the 
products concerned.  
The explanation of this contradictory result (between sanitary and phytosnanitary measures)  lies more 
in  the  ways  standards  are  harmonised  across  the  EU  than  in  the  actual  content  of  the  measures 
themselves.  In  fact,  sanitary  measures  have  been  regarded  as  very  important  by  the  European 
authorities whose aim is to guarantee European consumers a uniform and acceptable level of food 
safety throughout Europe. Hence, since the BSE crisis the European authorities have harmonised their 
sanitary measures to a very high degree (Ugland and Veggeland, 2006). This wave of harmonisation, 
which is more complete in the sanitary field than in the other, has even led to a higher degree of 
market integration through the use of regulation. This tool implies that all member states are obliged to   16
apply the regulation text strictly   without any national adaptation. 
Conversely, regarding residue level of pesticides (phytosanitary measures), pan EU harmonisation 
was, up until to 2005,carried out made through EU directives allowing member states a certain latitude 
to transpose this text in their law. The fact that these directives were transposed differently from one 
EU member to another means that some technical barriers remain inside the SEM despite the principle 
of Mutual Recognition and leads to a fragmented market, for the products concerned. The situation is 
similar for quality measures which encompass commercialisation and labelling considerations.  
To sum up, the results obtained suggest that sanitary measures act as trade barriers at entry to the EU 
market, but once standards are met by exporters they facilitate trade. This result is in line with the 
assumption made by the OECD (2002), as well as by Barret and Young (2001), who argue that 
internationally accepted product standards can facilitate international trade by reducing search and 
adjustment costs. On the contrary, as far as phytosanitary and quality measures are concerned, national 
differences in the transposition of regulations increase transaction costs for exporters and in this way 
increase trade barriers. The rest of this section presents more detailed results about the impact of NTBs 
according to the products’ provenance. Due to space constraints and to increase lisibility only results 
of the value of NTB coefficients are presented. The rest of the variables took expected signs and the 
majority of them were statistically significant (detailed results available upon request).  
 
  Role of NTBs according to the origin of the product 
   The impact of sanitary measures. 
Table 3 gives the impact of sanitary measures on the EU border effect faced by non EU countries. 
This border effect is split according to the presence or absence of sanitary measures for the three 
groups of countries. Coefficients are estimated with regard to intra EU trade – for which sanitary 
measures do not act as a trade barrier. It is noteworthy that according to our estimations, sanitary 
measures have no impact on intra EU trade whereas phytosanitary and quality measures hinder intra 
EU trade. These results confirm those obtained by Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) who 
show that EU harmonisation of food regulation has a major positive effect on intra EU trade.  
INSERT Table 3   17
For NMS countries, conversely to other third countries, sanitary measures do not increase the barriers 
faced at entry to the EU market (the coefficients of the probit results are not significantly different for 
products with and without sanitary measures, Table 3). This result means that, in the decision for NMS 
to export towards the EU, the border effect is not attributable to the presence of sanitary measures. 
Moreover, for products submitted to these measures, the volume of trade seems to be higher than for 
other products. This impact was reinforced between 1999 and 2004. Hence, standards seem to be met 
and consequently to stimulate trade. There are two possible explanations for this. First, as explained 
above, a uniform standard across the SEM reduces transaction costs; and second, EU importers place 
increasing trust in NMS products guaranteed by a standard. 
Analysing estimations
xvi of the sanitary impact for individual country shows that this is particularly 
true for Hungary, whose products with sanitary measures no longer face trade resistance at entry to EU 
markets.  Given  that  Hungarian  public  policy  imposes  EU  regulation  as  a  guideline  for  its  own 
regulation (Fehèr, 2002), this result is not surprising. Results for Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
show that the border effect has significantly reduced for products covered by sanitary measures. 
For acceding countries, these measures still act as important barriers at entry to the EU market (probit 
regression) while, in the volume equation, the difference between the two coefficients, for 1999 and 
2004, is not significant; meaning that these standards have no (or little) impact on the volume of trade. 
These results are confirmed by the conclusions of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health (European Commission, 2006), which underline the low level of compliance with EU 
standards in Bulgarian and Romanian meat and milk establishments (a considerable proportion of raw 
milk is currently not in compliance with EU requirements). Therefore, from 1 January 2007, these two 
countries will be accorded a transitional period to upgrade their production processes. During this 
period, the produce from non compliant firms will carry a special identification mark and will be sold 
only on the domestic market. A more important border effect would therefore be expected for these 
AC products, but taking into account the very low proportion of produce exported, we may assume 
that Romanian and Bulgarian firms exporting to the EU are compliant with EU standards. 
 
   The impact of phytosanitary measures.   18
Phytosanitary  measures  act  as  a  trade  barrier  at  entry  to  the  markets  (probit  results,  table  4). 
Nonetheless, this result is confirmed only for intra EU trade and imports from the Rest of the World. 
For  NMS  and  acceding  countries,  however, these phytosanitary measures have no impact on the 
decision to export to the EU market; and results in the probit estimations are not significantly different 
for the two years. That means that phytosanitary standards would not be a constraint at entry to the EU 
market for both NMS and Acceding countries. These results are consistent with the fact that these 
countries  are  small  consumers  of  pesticides
xvii.  According  to  the  European  Environment  Agency 
(2004), the mean consumption of pesticides (insecticides, herbicides, fungicides and others) in 1997 
was less than 0.75 kg/ha of UAAL for CEECs as well as for AC, while for the EU15 it was more than 
2.25 kg/ha. This situation, due mainly to economic necessity rather than environmental awareness, 
gives these countries an undeniable comparative advantage regarding the pesticide standards. Hence, 
CEECs  meet  the  European  standards;  but  as  these  standards  are  not  uniform  across  the  Single 
European Market, these measures increase trade costs and reduce the volume of trade; but this impact 
is much lower both for NMS and Acceding countries than for the EU 15. 
 
   The impact of quality measures. 
For quality measures unification is far from complete. Hence, our reference point is intra European 
trade of products without quality measures. The results show that, for intra European trade, quality 
measures have a negative impact mostly on the selection equation, but this impact tends to disappear 
in the volume equation. Nevertheless, such measures have less impact on intra EU trade than on other 
exporters. This result was expected since intra EU exporters are supposed to have best access to the 
single market.  
For third countries as well as NMS countries, applying the quality measures reduces both the decision 
to export and the volume traded. The same conclusion can be drawn in the case of Romania and 
Bulgaria. The lack of unification of quality measures thus inhibits the volume of internationally traded 
products in the SEM, whatever the country of provenance. This impact is widely recognised   e.g. food 
labelling, as a part of quality measures is denoted by OECD (2003) as a “contentious issue concerning 
agro food products, for which particular attention is needed in order to minimise the risk of disruptions   19
of international trade”. 
.  
V.  Conclusion  
A specific feature of this study is to identify the hindrances to European market access for agricultural 
and food products according to the origin of products, notably from Central and Eastern European 
countries. The first result of the paper is that the border effect remains greater for NMS and AC than 
for countries of the rest of the world, even at the end of the pre accession period for NMS. The aim 
therefore is to find explanations of border effects faced by CEECs and to explore whether European 
Enlargement’s event may influence their magnitude. 
 
Concerning the impact of tariffs, the results highlight the reduction in tariff elasticity for NMSs, whilst 
this coefficient remains stable for the rest of the world. It is noteworthy that tariffs no longer act as a 
trade  barrier  anymore  in  2004  for  NMS.  This  is  an  expected  result,  since  tariffs  for  NMS  were 
abolished in May 2004, the date of the EU enlargement. However, in 1999 the impact of tariffs is still 
high because the liberalisation process is far from complete.  
 
Concerning non tariff measures, obtained results show that for NMS, sanitary measures do not act as a 
barrier to trade at entry to the EU market and even significantly stimulate traded volume for NMS 
firms fulfilling sanitary requirements. For AC these measures still act as barrier to trade, and once the 
barrier has been overcome, traded volume is slightly increasing. Phytosanitary measures do not act as 
barrier to trade at entry to the EU market for CEECs’ products (both from NMS and ACs) but still 
limit traded volume. For third countries as well as NMS and AC, applying the quality measures 
reduces both the decision to export and the volume traded. The lack of unification of quality measures 
thus  inhibits  the  volume  of  internationally  traded  products  in  the  SEM,  whatever  the  country  of 
provenance. The impact of NTBs on the degree of European market access is less a matter of the 
specific nature of the NTB than of the degree of SEM harmonization among countries of the SEM  
 
These results call for two comments. The first comment deals with the CEECs fulfilments of the EU 
requirement (in other word, the acquis communautaire process efficiency). Sanitary measures have 
been fulfilled in NMSs leading to a non significant impact of such measures on decision to trade, 
whereas for ACs it was not the case, justifying therefore the transition period imposed by European 
authorities. Concerning phytosanitary measures, they do not act as trade barriers for CEECs product 
rather because the use level of pesticide is structurally low in those countries than because of the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire. 
The second comment deals with the opposite impacts of sanitary and phytosanitary measures on traded 
volume. Results concerning sanitary measures is easily explained because the high degree of food   20
safety policies’ integration in the EU. Phytosanitary and quality measures, far from integration on the 
SEM, still limit traded volume. Even the intra EU 15 trade is concerned by the negative role of those 
measures both on the decision to trade and on the traded volume. 
 
Results also show border effect is not totally explained by tariffs and non tariff measures, remaining 
trade resistances are still significant. In other words, determinants other than tariffs and non tariff 
measures explain trade resistance at entry to the EU market. This is particularly true for NMSs for 
which the border effect remains high. This fact calls for further investigation of several issues such as 
i) specific assets of these countries (as low transport infrastructure for instance), ii) still existing role of 
history  in  the  geographical  orientation  of  CEECs  trade  away  from  the  EU,  iii)  the  opinion  of  
European importers and consumers about the products originating from CEE .  
The  impact  of  enlargement  should  expectedly  reduce  this  remaining  resistance.  First  structural 
development programmes launched by the EU on the eve of accession and still in progress should 
improve specific assets. Secondly, the adoption of European standards CEEC firms should be less 
competitive than before on their previous partner market, since higher standards imply higher prices . 
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Table 1: Tariffs applied by the European Union. Arithmetic average for agricultural and food 
products 
  1999  2004 
Czech Repubic  14.91  5.49 
Estonia  15.81  5.16 
Hungary  15.05  4.93 
Lithuania  16.13  5.14 
Latvia  16.15  5.36 
Poland  13.98  5.83 
Slovenia  16.36  5.95 
Slovakia  14.93  5.42 
Bulgaria  14.62  5.5 
Romania  14.58  8.22 
MFN rate  18.1  16.3 
Source: own computations based on TARIC database   23
 
Table 2: Impact of tariffs and NTBs on the EU Border Effect : 
Table 2a Results of the probit model 
model 1 :  model 2 :  
Probit 
1999  2004  1999  2004 
Imports  0.07 (0.001)  0.06 (0.001) 
Exports  0.24 (0.001)  0.24 (0.001) 
Distance  -0.57 (0.003)  -0.53 (0.003) 
Contiguity  0.28 (0.01)  0.25 (0.01) 
Colony  0.68 (0.01)  0.80 (0.01)    
Border effect (reference to EU) 
ROW -0.23 (0.009)  -0.29 (0.008)  -0.17 (0.008)  -0.18 (0.007) 
NMS  -1.10 (0.01)  -0.98 (0.01)  -0.92 (0.02)  -0.92 (0.02) 
AC  -0.77 (0.03)  -0.69 (0.02)  -0.63 (0.04)  -0.57 (0.03) 
Tariffs 
Tariffs ROW        -0.03 (0.003)  -0.04 (0.003) 
Tariffs NMS        -0.08 (0.009)  -0.004* (0.01) 
Tariffs AC        -0.04 (0.02)  -0.02* (0.02) 
NTBs 
Sanitary measures      -0.21 (0.008)  -0.29 (0.008) 
Max level of Residues      -0.26 (0.01)  -0.12 (0.01) 
Quality      -0.08 (0.009)  -0.18 (0.009) 
Table 2b Results of the regression equation of the Relative Bilateral Index 
model 1 :  model 2 :   ln(RIijk) 
Relative Bilateral Index  1999  2004  1999  2004 
Competitiveness  -0.17 (0.009)'  -0.15 (0.01) 
Distance  -0.27(0.005)  -0.27 (.005) 
Contiguity  1.80 (0.03)  1.77 (0.03) 
Colony  1.32 (0.03)  1.44 (.03)    
Border effect (reference to EU-15) 
ROW  -1.04 (0.02)  -1.25 (0.02)  -0.47 (0.02)  -0.54 (0.02) 
NMS  -1.42 (0.04)  -1.40 (0.03)  -0.92 (0.06)  -1.05 (0.06) 
AC  -0.55 (0.09)  -0.66 (0.08)  -0.45 (0.13)  -0.51 (0.10) 
Tariffs 
TariffsROW       -0.39 (0.009)  -0.44 (0.01) 
Tariffs NMS       -0.30 (0.03)  -0.19 (0.03) 
Tariffs AC       0.36 (0.07)  0.37 (0.06) 
NTBs 
Sanitary measures        0.26 (0.02)  0.16 (0.02) 
Max level of Residues        -0.19 (0.03)  -0.09 (0.03) 
Quality        -0.10 (0.02)  -0.19 (0.02) 
Nb of observations : 586 568 ; censored obersvations : 473 473 
Validation of selection bias in both models (Rho significantly ¹0) 
Notes: * denotes non significant coefficients at 15 per cent. All the other coefficients are significant at less than 
10 per cent. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 3: The impact of sanitary measures on the EU border effect 
Regression results 
on the volume of trade  
Probit results  
on the decision to export  Sanitary measures 
1999  2004  1999  2004 
NO -0.38 (0.03) -0.57 (0.03) -0.11 (0.01) -0.10 (0.009)  Rest of the World 
YES -0.35 (0.03) -0.65 (0.03) -0.26 (0.009) -0.37 (0.009) 
NO -0.99 (0.08) -1.27 (0.07) -0.92 (0.02)  -0.99 (0.02)  New Member 
States  YES -0.74 (0.07) -0.81 (0.07) -0.94 (0.02)  -0.96 (0.02) 
NO -0.48 (0.17) -0.61 (0.12) -0.56 (0.05)  -0.46 (0.04)  Acceding 
countries  YES -0.32 (0.15) -0.43 (0.12) -0.72 (0.05)  -0.77 (0.04) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets 
 
Table 4: The impact of phytosanitary measures on the EU border effect 
Regression results 
on the volume of trade  
Probit results  
on the decision to export  Max level of Residues 
1999  2004  1999  2004 
NO -0.37 (0.03)  -0.21 (0.009) -0.22 (0.009) -0.58 (0.02)  Rest of the World 
YES -0.66 (0.04)  -0.44 (0.01) -0.33 (0.01) -0.72 (0.04) 
NO -0.91 (0.06)  -0.96 (0.02) -0.98 (0.02) -1.11 (0.07)  New Member 
States  YES -1.08 (0.09)  -1.18 (0.03) -1.01 (0.03) -1.04 (0.08) 
NO -0.46 (0.15)  -0.71 (0.05) -0.62 (0.04) -0.62 (0.11)  Acceding 
countries  YES -0.57 (0.17)  -0.82 (0.05) -0.69 (0.05) -0.45 (0.13) 
EU15  YES -0.19 (0.04)  -0.37 (0.02) -0.23 (0.02) -0.10 (0.04) 
Notes:  standard  errors  are  in  brackets.  Because  phytosanitary  measures  (Maximum  Level  of  Residue  of 
Pesticides) has an impact on intra EU trade, the reference here is to intra EU trade for products without any 
MLR regulation.  
 
Table 5: The impact of quality measures on the EU border effect 
Regression results 
on the volume of trade  
Probit results  
on the decision to export  Quality 
1999  2004  1999  2004 
NO -0.37 (0.03) -0.57 (0.02) -0.18 (0.009) -0.19 (0.008)  Rest Of the 
World  YES -0.54 (0.04) -0.81 (0.03) -0.26 (0.01)  -0.38 (0.01) 
NO -0.88 (0.06) -1.04 (0.06) -0.92 (0.02)  -0.93 (0.02)  New Member 
States  YES -1.01 (0.10) -1.22 (0.10) -0.98 (0.02)  -1.04 (0.03) 
NO -0.42 (0.13) -0.48 (0.10) -0.66 (0.04)  -0.59 (0.03)  Acceding 
countries  YES -0.36 (0.22) -0.85 (0.18) -0.49 (0.07)  -0.66 (0.06) 
EU15  YES -0.01 (0.04) -0.09* (0.04) -0.13 (0.02)  -0.21 (0.02) 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. * denotes non significance at  5 per cent. 
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ENDNOTES 
i This material has been not previously presented. 
ii Among others, see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Head and Mayer, 
2000; Mayer and Zignago, 2005.  
iii Usually these models are defined at a very aggregated level, but they have been also employed for 
studies at industry level (Head and Mayer (2002), Chen (2004), Nahuis (2004), Manchin et al. (2003)) 
and even at product level (Havenam and Thursby, 2000 or Vancauteren and Henry de Frahan, 2006) 
for the agricultural sector. 
iv This approach has been used also by Mayer and Zignago (2005). 
v In regards with theoretical equations (2) and (3), structural value of several coefficients can be 
deduced: a0=1 s; a1=s 1;a2=r(1 s); a3=z (1 s).  
vi The dataset is comprised of 212 exporting countries. 
vii  To  capture  the  CEECs  heterogeneity  and  check  the  robustness  of  results,  border  effect  was 
separated country by country for NMS and acceding countries. The results did not change significantly 
and are available upon request.   
viii In regards with theoretical equations (2) and (3), structural value of several coefficients can be 
deduced: a0=1 s; a1=s 1;a2=r(1 s); a3=z (1 s); a4=n (1 s); a6=q (1 s); a7=l1 (1 s), a8=l2 (1 s), 
a9=l3(1 s) with li individual NTB effect 




 are combinations of previous a7 and a4 
x Zero values found in the trade database correspond in fact either to genuine zero flow, or to a flow 
below a certain reporting threshold. Such thresholds are very low and therefore assimilated to an 
absence of trade. 
xi Results of the tests are available upon request. 
xii Available on the CEPII website : http://www.cepii.fr/ 
xiii Conversion into ad valorem equivalents has been done using TARAGRO software (Gallezot and 
Harel, 2004). 
xiv In the pre accession period all CEECs10 were on this list, and were therefore able to export to any 
European country.  
xv  Directive  76/895/EEC;  fruit  and  vegetables  (Directive  76/895/EEC),  cereals  (Directive 
86/362/EEC),  foodstuffs  of  animal  origin  (Directive  86/363/EEC)  and  plant  products  (Directive 
90/642/EEC). In order to harmonize them, these directives have been replaced by a unique regulation 
in 2005: Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 
2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in products of plant and animal origin 
xvi Available upon request 
xvii  As  recently  published  by  Eurostat  (2006),  the  quantity  of  commercial  fertilisers  in  2001  was 
highest in France, followed by Germany, Spain, UK, Italy, Poland, Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, 
Czech  Republic,  Romania,  Hungary,  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden,  Portugal,  Austria,  Lithuania,   26
                                                                                                                                                          
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus with Malta the lowest. 